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ABSTRACT
This Final Report for NASA/JSC Contract NAS 9-14915, "Independent Evalu-
ation of Shuttle Flight Control System," presents a brief summary of the work
performed on the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) Shuttle flight control system
(FCS) and references a bibliography of the formal reports generated during the
contract period which document the activities in det.il . In general, the acti-
vities were grouped in four categories: (1) independent evaluation of ALT FCS
software design; (2) independent evaluation of Software Development Laboratory
(SDL) Lesting of ALT FCS software; (3) independent evaluation of Shuttle
Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) ALT FCS testing; and (4) independent
evaluation of ALT flight test results.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This final report provides a brief summary of the analyses performed
for the Avionics Systems Engineering Division of NASA/JSC under Contract
NAS 9-14915, "Independent Evaluation of the Shuttle Flight Control System,"
and references a bibliography of the formal reports, generated during the con-
tract period, which document the activities in detail. The activities per-
formed under this stud, fall into four general categories: (1) independent
evaluation of ALT FCS software design; (2) independent evaluation of Software
Development Laboratory (SDL) testing of the ALT FCS software; (3) independent
evaluation of Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) ALT FCS test-
ing; and (4) independent evaluation of ALT flight test results. Each of these
activities is discussed in the following sections.
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2.0 DISCUSSION
2.1 Independent Evaluation of ALT FCS Software Design
As a result of detailed investigations of the HAL code for the FCS, TRW
developed HAL signal flow diagrams (Reference 1-1) to provide roadmaps through
the complex hierarchy of the FCS application software modules. These signal
flow diagrams were manually produced and would be quite expensive to modify
as the software changed. In response to their inquiry, the Shuttle Program
Assessment Office was informed of this difficulty (keference 1-2) and they
have contracted with Intermetrics Inc. to develop an automatic signal flow
generator.
To effect a trace between the Functional Subsystem Software Requirements
(FSSR) and the HAL code, TRW developed tables of Level C FCS FSSR signal traces
to HAL code parameters and memory locations (References 1-3 through 1-6).
These tables correlate the signals and constants in the ALT Level C FCS FSSRs
to their corresponding HAL parameters ar.d the memory locations of these HAL
parameters. The internal units of the HAL parameters were derived and re-
corded in the tables. This tracing was performed for the aileron, elevator,
body flap, and rudder/nosewheel control channels and proved valuable in mon-
itoring FCS testing, defining and monitoring FCS troubleshooting procedures,
and performing post-test analyses.
Based on our intimate knc , :ledge of the FCS software, TRW performed
several analyses to specify exactly how the software would perform in com-
parison to the FSSR specification (References 1-7 through 1-10). These analyses
included a definition of the mechanization of the Program Test Input Program
(stroking test); an evaluation of the automatic nosewheel steering gain; an
evaluation of rudder transients during rollout; and the definition and pro-
posed solution to GN&C sawtooth response due to navigation filter performance.
In some cases, these analyses uncovered initialization-load (I-Load) errors
which would cause unexpected and unde:,ired responses. In the case of the GN&C
sawtooth response, a GN&C interaction problem was uncovered and a solution was
recommende.j. The solution was not implem p nted during ALT due to schedule
constraints. However, the solution is being considered for the OFT design.
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This analysis pointed out the need for system-level analyses of the GN&C
system to uncover interaction problems.
A major analysis item began with detailed evaluatior of the GN&C soft-
ware and propagated to a general evaluation of the onboard flight software.
The specific study was the evaluation of the use of the divide function in
the GN&C software, from the standpoint of possible division by zero. TRW
found that there were thirty-one divisions in the GN&C applications software
which were not protected from division by zero (References 1-11 and 1-12).
TRW determined that significant impact could result from such errors, not
only from the standpoint of the erroneous numerical result of this operation,
but also from the standpoint of software operation. It was found that if a
sufficient number of such errors occur during a cycle of a given software
process, that process would stop (forced closed) for the remainder of the
process. It was further determined by TRW that a number of other errors
(overflows, unnormalized input to floating-point divide, and overflow on
conversion from floating-point to fixed-point) could result in similar prob-
lems. These susceptibilities were reported at the ALT and OFT Orbiter Avionics
Software Control Board (OASCB) meetings. The decision was made by the OASCB
to accept the risks of these vulnerabilities for ALT but to add protection for
the OFT software design. TRW worked with IBM and Ri OFT design personnel
(Reference 1-13) to familiarize them with the nature of the problem ind to
establish a plan of action for OFT. TRW supported the develo pme . ,	 a
Technical Directive to RI for specific OFT action required to provide pro-
tection (Reference 1-14).
It should be noted that the vehicle encountered division by zero and
negative square roots during several of the ALT captive-active and free flights
wh'ch had not been predicted in SDL, ADL, or SAIL testing. The problems were
not severe but the incidents dramatically highlight the fact that actual flights
subject the system to a much wider range of conditions than those simulated
at the verification faciliti ^s.
TRW also investigated the AP101 General Purpose Computer (GPC) system
software to establish how the system software performed the input/output (I/0)
40-
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4traffic through the GN&C appli-ation software (Reference 1-15). One specific
FCS I/O transaction was examined to trace through the complex data transfers
which are associated with the I/O traffic. The general observation from this
examination is that the complexity of, and limited visibility into the system
software appear to be inappropriate for safety-critical, single-point failure
software.
2.2 Independent Evaluation of SDL Testing
TRW participated in the IBM dry-run presentations prior to the ALT
software Configuration Inspection (CI). Module-level tests were reviewed
and based on our insight into the FCS software, TRW recommended some addi-
tional testing (Reference 2-1). The total set of module-level tests and
several GN&C system-level test] were evaluated at the ALT CI. This CI cov-
ered the SDL testing of the software for the tailcone-off vehicle configur-
ation. TRW submitted a number of Review I'.em Dispositions (RIDS) which
addressed the completeness of the testing; correlation of test cases to the
elements of software that were exercised; and the need for evaluation of sys-
tem software performance under multiple GPC conditions (Reference 2-2). The
reference also cites major observations from the CI, including:
a. The objectives of the CI were not clearly established;
b. The volume of data and limited time available for its digestion
precluded a meaningful review;
c. Much testing that was assumed to be in the purview of SDL testing
was deferred to ADL and SAIL testing and the capability of these
facilities are extremely limited;
d. The nature of the data presented at the CI did not allow a definitive
assessment of the adequacy of the verification testing; and
e. The fact that the SDL testing was limited to that defined in the
Verification Test Specification (VTS) and the Verification Test
Procedure (VTP) was not well known prior to the CI or at the time
of issuance of these documents.
To provide a more comprehensive measure of expected GN&C performance
for assessing SDL and other GN&C verification testing, TRW collected a set
of GN&C performance requirements from various sources including the System
Design Manuals (SDMs) and Certification Requirements (CP,$) and provided this
compilation to the technical community (Reference 2-3). These performance
requirements were subsequently used by TRW in assessing the '.CI test results
as well as SAIL test results.
In response to the RID that we submitted at the CI concerning correla-
tion of testing to specific software elements, TRW generated examples of this
correlation. Since the Shuttle system softwerd design precludes a precise
definition of all executioi, paths, "all" paths through the software cannot
be verified. TRW recoiibmend5 that, at a minimum, the MAC software verification
effort address exercising each executable statement in the GN&C applications
software at least once. TRW provided two techniques for systemaLically cor-
relating the test cases to the software code to establish tnat this require-
ment has been met (Reference 2-4),
Preparatory to the 'CI (tailcone-on vehicle configuration), TRW reviewed
the results of software performance testing at the " rbiter Aerodynamic Simu-
lator (OAS). As described in Reference 2-', only limited information could be
extracted from these runs since the available data was restricted primarily
to the downlink data and the runs were not flown by skilled crewmen.
Also preparatory to the .SCI, TRW performed detailed evaluations of
eighteen GN&C system performance cases implemented on the SDL. The GN&C
performance requirements assimilated by TRW were applied and violations were
noted. Resposise characteristics which did not violate any constraints but were
unexpected were identified. The results of this review and a summary of the
TRW ACI parti ,:ipation are documented in Reference 2-6. The major facts from
this review, the RIDs submitted by TRW, and evaluation of the testing philos-
ophy include:
a. Undesirable navigation/guidance/flight control transient interactions
result from design deficienc i es both in the requirements definition
and in the software implementation;
b. System performance requ i rements, as applied by TRW, were not accepted
by the CI Board as criteria for software verification;
c. Comparison between the SDL and CSDL Statement Level Simulator (SLS)
results yie l ded valuable qualitative information un the software
compatibility with requirements but is extremely expensive to im-
plement;
d. There is a need to establish realistic stress cases which establish
the GN&C system performance envelope and it is not economically
feasible to implement this work on the SDL, ADL, or SAIL; and
1
e. The CPU stress testing was inadequate to establish the impact on
GN&C performance of cycle overruns.
IBM received an action from the ACI to perform additional CPU stress
tests. TRW reviewed the results of these tests to establish the effect on
GN&C performance. These reviews indicated that in one set of the stress
cases, the initial conditions varied sufficiently among the test cases to
preclude a meaningful comparison, among the runs.
	 In a second set, trie ini-
tial conditions were more similar but the results did not demonstrate the
"graceful degradation" of GN&C performance that had been advertised. TRW's
position is that the impact of cycle overruns on GN&C performance is not well
understood nor easily predictable.
TRW continued to monitor the I-Load regression tests performed on the
SDL by IBM to verify that the software would perform adequately for each ALT
flight 1-Load. TRW established a technique for correlating the I-Load changes
with the method for verification, which was adopted by IBM (Reference 2-1).
Some results of TRW's review of the test results are documented in Reference
2-8.
2.3 Independent Evaluation of SAIL Testing
TRW was a member of the ALT Certification Team created by the Avionics
Systems Engineering Division. One of our major roles in this team was a review
of SAIL test plans and test results and, prior ':o formal testing, active
participation in SAIL testing.
TRW reviewed the SAIL Test and Checkout Procedures (TCPs) and provided
corrections and additions for these detailed procedures (References 3-1 and 3-2).
TRW participated in coordinated ADL/SAIL test planning for the ALT FCS (Ref-
erence 3-3).
Prior to formal certification testing, TRW provided active participation
in SAIL testing and performed analyses of several Interim Discrepancy Reports
(IDRs) and defined and supported a number of troubleshooting procedures to
resolve IDRs.
	
This participation included:
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a. Nosewheel Steering Troubleshooting (Reference 3-4);
b. Evaluation of SAIL roll and pitch stew responses (Peferences 3-5);
c. Evaluation of the Dedicated Display cests (Reference 3-6);
d. Definition of IMU discretes associated with IMU initiaiization
(Reference 3-7);
e. Evaluation of incorrect mode response to PNC activity (Reference
3-d);
f. Analysis of SAIL navigation errors (Reference 3-9); and
g. Evaluation of SAIL area navigation test (Reference 3-10).
A number of these analyses required evaluation of the math models within the
SAIL simulation.
TRW was a principal investigator of the two SAIL certification runs for
Free-Flight 1 (Reference 3-11). We established the procedures and data re-
quirements for this analysis which were used by the ALT Certificat , :,n Team for
analyses of subsequent SAIL r:!ns. Additional evaluations of these two runs
were documented in Reference 3-12.
As a meirjuer of the ALT Certification Team, fRW performed detailed anaiyses
of certification runs for Free-Flights 2, 3, and 4. To assure timeliness,
documentation of these analyses was made directly through the NASA/JSC re
porting system. Special reporting of problems generally was contained under
the standard reporting with exceptions such as the reporting of non-stationary
aerosurface positions during a four second period when the primary GPCs were
frozen and the Backup Flight Control System (BFCS) had not been engaged
(Reference 3-13).
to anticipation of OFT activities, TRW participated in several meetings
in vhich verification/certification testing at the SAIL. and other facilities
were di-cussed. These meetings were reported in References 3-14, 3-15, and
3-16.
2.4 Independent Evaluation of AL T Flight Test Results
To provide a correlation of actual flight performance to the predicted
performance, TRW supported the ALT Free-Flights 1 through 4 in the Mission
7
tEvaluation Room and performed postflight analyses of specific anomalies
or specific response characteristics. These analyses included:
a. Evaluation of elevon drift during CA-lA (Reference 4-1);
b. Evaluation of FCS command compatibility with rate gyro feedback
(References 4-2);
c. Analysis of rudder lag during CA-lA (Reference 4-3);
d. Evaluation of erratic Horizontal Situation Indicator displays dur-
ing CA-3 (Reference 4-4);
e. Evaluation of FF-1 onboard state vectors (Reference 4-5);
f. Observations of navigation state transients in FF-1 due to naviga-
tion and MLS SOP computation frequency nismatch (Reference 4-6);
g. Analysis of FCS tran;nirt delays in the CSS mode (Referemce 4-1);
h. Analysis of FF-3 onboard state vectors (Refe ,•ence 4-8).
The major observation on the 4LT flight results is that the flights
subjected the onboard system to a much broader range of conditions than was
used in the preflight verification/certification testing at the SOL, AFL,
and SAIL. This was particularly true of the navigation system. 	 Indeed, there
were a significant number of transients in the navigation state which had not
been observed during preflight testing. Postflight .nalyses indicated that,
for most cases, the transients resulted from unique flight conditions. The
concern is that these transients are generally undesirable and, in flight,
proved to be the rule rather than the exception.
2.5 Work Plan Reporting
The work plan and progress of the work were reported monthly in progress
reports. These are documented in References 5-1 through 5-12.
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Reference
Number
1-1
1-2
1-3
Date
23 Dec 1976
11 Nov 1976
22 Dec 1976
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Subject
HAL Signal Flow Diagram
Meeting with Program
Assessment Office
Transmittal of Level C
Flight Control System
FSSR Signal Trace to
HAL Code Parameters and
Memory Locations
Transmittal of Level C
Flight Control System
FSSR Signal Trace to HAL
Code Parameters and
!4emory Locations
Transmittal of Level C
Flight Control System
FSSR Signal Trace to HAL
Code Parameters and
Memory Locations
Transmittal of Updated
Level C Flight Control
System FSSR Signal Trace
to HAL Code Parameters
and Memory Locations for
ALT 23.0
Program Test Input
(Stroking Test) Response
I/O Transactions for FCS,
an Example
Rudder Transients During
Rollout
Solution to the NAV Filter/
FCS Interaction Problem
Review of Program Divides
in ALT Software (Version
20)
1-4
	
31 Jan 1911
Letter Number
TRW 76:2511.7-102
(76:2511.7-103)
TRW 76:2511.7-89
TRW 76:2511.7-101
TRW 77:2511.7-19
'-5
	
4 Mar 1977	 TRW 77:2511.7-36
1-6
	
25 May 1977
	
TRW 17.2511.1-16
	
1-7
	
14 Jan 1977
	
TRW 77:2511.7-3
	
1-8
	
18 Mar 1977
	
TRW 77:2511.7-46
	
1-9
	
26 May 1977
	
TRW 77:2511.7-78
(77:2511.7-91)
	
1-10
	
26 May 1977
	
TRW 77:2511.7-79
(77:2511.7-80)
	
1-11
	
10 Mar 1911
	
TRW 77:2511.7-40
(77:2511.7-41)
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Reference
Number Date Letter Number Subject
1-12 7 Apr 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-58 Review of Protection of
(77:2511.7-59) Program Divides
	 in ALT
Software
1-13 8 Jun 1911 TRW 77:2511.7-89 Review Conxnents on RI
Presentation to OFT
UASCB on Program Check
Protection
1-14 14 Jep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-129 Software Error Conditions
(77:2511.7-130)
1-15 19 Mar 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-47 I/O Transactions for FCS,
(77:2511.7-61 an Example
2-1 27 Jan 1911 TRW 77:2511.7-17 Coiriments on	 IBM Briefings
(77:2511.7-18) on SDL Testing of ALT
Flight Control	 Software
2-2 11 Mar 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-31 ALT Confiquration Inspection
2-3 1 Mar 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-34 GN&C Performance Require-
(77:2511.7-37) lnents
2-4 25 Mar 1977 TRW 11:2511.7-51 ALT Software Verification
(77:2511.7-52)
2-5 29 Mar 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-55 Review of SW Performance
(77:2511.7-60) Runs Performed for IBM
at the OAS Facility
2-6 19 May 1911 TRW 77:3511.7-72 nCI Summary
(77:2511.7-75)
2-7 7 Jun 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-86 GN&C	 I-Load Parameter
(77:2511.7-38 Variations	 from I-Load
6.1	 to	 11.1
2-8 15 Jun 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-93 Evaluation of Captive
(77:2511.7-94) Active	 (CAI)	 I-Load
Regression Tests
3-1 16 Nov 1976 TRW 76:2511.7-92 SAIL Test and Checkout
Procedures Reviews
3-2 2 Feb 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-23 Expected BFCS Commands
(77:2511.7-25) during Sequence 8 Tests
in TCP 2002, Volume 2
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Reference
Number Date Letter Number Subject
3-3 18 Nov 1976 TRW 76:2511.7-95 Rockwell	 FCS Verification
(76:2511.7-96) Plan
3-4 14 Jan 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-4 Nosewheel	 StEering Trouble-
shooting Procedure
3-5 17 Jan 1977 'RW 77:2511.7-5 SAIL Run Analysis
(77:2.11.7-7)
3-6 18 Jan 1977 TRW 77:?511.7-9 Dedicated Display Tests
(77:2E11.7-10)
3-7 18 Jan 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-8 Review of	 IMU Related Dis-
(77:2511.7-11) cretes which would be
Supplied by the
	
IMU Math
Models when Performing SAIL
"Fast	 Initialization"
3-8 25 Jan 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-14 SAIL Anomalies	 213-216 and
(71:2`.	 1.7-15) IDR 8BCF76064	 1
3-9 2 Feb 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-22 Investigation	 .,,	 Navigation
(77:2511.7-24) Error Observed during
Special	 Nav Test on 16
January 1977
3-10 3 Ma , - ,917 TRW 77:2511.7-35 SAIL Anomaly 270 and	 IDR
(77:2511.7-38) 8BCF76078, Area Navigation
3-11 19 May 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-73 Review of SAIL Certification
(77:2511.7-74) Runs	 131-2 and	 131-4	 in
Support of FMCF
3-12 13 Jun 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-90 Analysis of Rudder Transients
(77:2511.7-92) during	 Rollout
3-13 18 Aug 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-118 SAIL Run No.	 23, One
(77:2511.7-120) Generic	 Fail
3-14 30 Sep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-131 FCS Meeting cl Element
(77:2511.7-134) Interface Tests for OFT
3-15 30 Sep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-132 SIGFLO Meeting
(77:2511.7-135)
3-16 3 Oct 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-133 Trip Report; TRW and RI,
(/7:2511.7-138) 20-23 September 1977
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Reference
Number Date Letter Number Sutl jqe t
4-1 7 Jul 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-100 Llevator Drift Observed on
(77:2511.7-101) Captive-Active
	
Flight
	
IA
4-2 14 Jul 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-103 FCS Response to 747 "S"
(77:2511.7-105) Turn Inputs on Flight CA-lA
4-3 25 Jul 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-107 Rudder Lag in CSS Mode during
(;7:2511.7-108) CA-lA CSS Stability and
Polarity Checks
4-4 10 Aug 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-114 HSI Leading Card and Bearing
(77:2511.7-116) NEedle Erratic Behavior
Observed on Mission CA-3
4-5 2 Sep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-122 Evaluation of FF1	 Onboard
(77:2511.7-125) State Vectors
4-6 7 Sep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-123 Periodic 48-Second Glitches
(77:2511.7-124 in the Navigated State
during	 FF-1
4-7 9 Sep 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-126 FCS Transport Delays	 - CSS
(77:2511.7-12P
4-8 11 Oct 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-140 FF3 Onboard State Vectors
5-1 13 Oct 1976 TRW 76:2511.7-80 Study Plan for Independent
Evaluation of Shuttle
Flight Control	 System
5-2 13 Oct 1976 TRW 76:2511.?-81 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period Ending 15
October	 1976
5-3 12 Nov 1976 TRW 76:2511.7-90 NAS 9-14915 Progress	 Report
for Period Ending	 15
November 1976
5-4 13 Dec 1976 TRW 76:2511.7-100 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for the Period Ending
	 15
December 1976
5-5 17 Jan 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-6 NAS 9-14915 Progress 	 Report
for Period Loding	 15
January 1977
5-6 15 Feb 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-27 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period Ending	 15
February 1977
. 1
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Reference
Number Date Letter Number SubLect
5-7 15 Mar 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-43 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period Ending	 15 March
1977
5-8 18 Apr 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-62 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period	 Ending	 15 April
1977 ...
-9 18 May 1911 TRW 77:2511.7-71 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period	 Ending	 15 flay
1977
5-10 16 Jun 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-95 NAS 9-14915 Progress Re?ort
for Period Lnding	 15 June
1977
5-11 18 Jul 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-104 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period	 Ending
	 15 July
1977
5-12 17 Aug 1977 TRW 77:2511.7-117 NAS 9-14915 Progress Report
for Period	 Ending	 15
August 1977
13
